We elicit time preferences of spouses separately, as well as jointly, among rural households in China. This is done with a high-stakes time preference experiment. We apply a random parameter model to investigate within-household bargaining power. In general, husbands have a stronger influence on joint household decisions, however, wives gain influence in richer households and when the couple has been married for a longer time.
Introduction
An important question in development economics is the role of time preferences for household behavior. In particular, time preferences influence things such as resource use and educational choices, which in turn have important implications for poverty, growth, and the environment (see e.g. Pender, 1996; Holden et al., 1998) . There are a number of studies linking behavior, outcomes, and time preferences in developing countries. For example, Ashraf et al. (2006) find that women with lower discount rates are more likely to open commitment savings account in the Philippines, Tanaka et al. (2010) find a positive correlation between household income and patience in Vietnam, while Kirby find a correlation between education and income, and patience in a study of indigenous people in the Bolivian rainforest.
1 However, many decisions related to time -e.g., labor supply, savings, investments in agricultural technology, and investment in children's education -are often made by households rather than by individual members. If we are to better understand household behavior, it is therefore important to learn more about how decision within the household are made, and to investigate the relative influence of husbands and wives in household decision making. In particular, since evidence suggests that there are differences in preferences between men and women (see e.g. Eckel and Grossman, 2008) .
In the experimental literature, most of the empirical studies on household behavior have dealt with risk choice (Peters et al., 2004; Bateman and Munro, 2005; Iversen et al., 2006; de Palma et al., 2009; Munro et al. , Bateman and McNally, 2008) , consumption choices (Arora and Allenby, 1999; Browning and Chiappori, 1998) , or with stated preference surveys (Beharry-Borg et al., 2009, Dosman and Adamowicz, 2006; Strand, 2007; Quiggin, 1998) . In this paper, we report the results of an experiment on choices between early and late rewards of money conducted with households in rural China. Both the husband and wife participate in the experiment. At first, they make individual choices, and thus revealing their individual time preferences. After that, they have to make joint choices with exactly the same experimental design. By relating the individual choices to the joint choices, we can estimate the relative influence of the husband and the wife on the joint decision. As far as we know, no study has looked at choices involving time, let alone in a developing country context. The households participating in our study are poor rural households in the Chinese province Guizhou.
Measuring the relative influence of for example spouses is difficult, though, as it requires observing individual decisions of spouses as well as joint household decisions. While this is hardly possible with field data, controlled experimental data allows collecting both individual and joint decisions. Given such data, the next challenge is to determine the relative influence of each spouse on the household's joint decision. In this paper we use a random parameter modeling approach in order to meet this challenge (for an overview of random parameter models, see e.g., Train, 2003) . Based on data from the experiment we estimate the relative bargaining power between spouses at the household level. We find that, in general, husbands have a stronger influence on household decisions than wives. However, wives gain influence the richer the household is and the longer the couple has been married. Furthermore, when wives are in charge for making small investment decisions in their household, then their individual preferences are also better reflected in the joint experimental decision.
The outline of the remaining paper is as follows: Section 2 introduces the experimental design and procedure. Section 2 presents the econometric model. Section 4 presents the experimental results, and Section 5 concludes the paper.
Experimental design and procedure

Location of the experiment
The experiment was conducted in October 2007 in villages of Majiang County in Guizhou province, which is located in the southwest part of China. 2 The province is one of the least developed provinces in China, with a gross domestic product per capita of 6,742 Chinese Yuan in 2007 which is equal to only 32% of the national average (21,049 Yuan in 2007; see NBS, 2008) .
Seven villages from five townships were randomly chosen, and in each village, 10-24 households with official married status were randomly selected based on the official registration list provided by the government. The number of households chosen in each village was in proportion to the size of the village. The enumerators were sent to households' home, and each household was first asked to answer a questionnaire concerning farming and forestry issues and then they voluntarily chose to participate in the experiment. In order to prevent villagers from spreading the word about the experiment within a village, we employed 20 interviewers so that all experiments within a village could be finished within five hours. In total, 101 couples voluntarily participated in the experiment without any couple refusing to participate.
As for the basic socioeconomic characteristics of the sampled households shown in Table 1 , the average yearly per capita income is 4,203 Chinese Yuan. On average, 42% of the income is generated from off-farm jobs, 36% from agriculture, and the remaining part comes from forestry, remittances, and other sources. Women on average contribute 42% of the total household income. The average number of years of schooling is 6.09 for husbands and 3.62 for wives in our sample, while the overall average in the province of Guizhou is 6.75 years. Among the couples in our sample, the average length of marriage is 26 years. The average number of children is 2.7. In addition, 14.5% of the wives have a higher education than their husbands, and 29% of the wives are older than their husbands. 
Experimental design
The time preference experiment consists of 18 pair-wise choices as shown in Table 2 . The subjects face a randomized order of the choices in the experiment rather than the order presented in the table to avoid ordering effect. In the experiment, the subjects must make a choice between Option A (early reward) and Option B (late reward). For example, in the first set, subjects must choose between receiving 12 Yuan today or 13 Yuan in four days. The amount of the rewards varies between nine and 21 Yuan. The early reward is either today or in four days, and the late reward in four or eight days. 3 The difference in reward between the early and the delayed payoff is one, three, or five Yuan. Two experimenters were sent to each household to conduct the experiment. After agreeing to participate, the two spouses were separated into two rooms. When they were seated, the instructions were read out loud by the experimenters. Throughout the experiment, the subjects complete the tasks step by step by following the experimental instructions. The whole experiment consisted of four parts. In part 1, each spouse had to answer a detailed questionnaire on sociodemographic characteristics, health status, and social capital individually. In Part 2, each spouse made individual decisions in the experiment. In Part 3, the two spouses were reunited and had to
give joint answers regarding the financial situation of the household and some additional household characteristics. Part 4 was identical to Part 2, except that the spouses had to make joint decisions, which means that they had to agree on which option to choose in the 18 choice tasks.
When introducing Part 4, participants were informed that the amounts in the selected option would be paid to each of the spouses. This procedure was used to keep each spouse's incentives constant across Parts 2 and 4. The experimenters were present in the same room to be able to answer any questions immediately, and they recorded a joint decision as fixed only after both spouses had given their consent. 4 Both in Part 2 and Part 4 subjects were instructed that one of the 18 decisions in each part would be played out for real at the end of the experiment (by drawing one card from a deck of cards, numbered 1 to 18), and in Part 2 it was stressed that the payment for Part 2 would be done separately for husbands and wives in different rooms. Note that each part was introduced sequentially only after the previous part was done.
The data was collected as part of a forestry household survey of 101 respondents in Guizhou province of China. Respondents who chose a particular amount due "today" were immediately paid after the whole survey and experiment were finished. Respondents who had to be paid later (in four or eight days) were given a certificate, signed by Peking University, which indicated the amount of money redeemable on the specified date. In particular, the certificate stated that the household needed to show the certified paper to receive the payment. The payment was delivered to their home by a project assistant at a time of day specified by the couple.
Estimation approach
The data needed to measure the bargaining power within a household are both the preferences/choices of each spouse as well as the joint preferences/choices of the couple. In the experiment we observe the choices between alternatives rather than the preferences directly. The alternatives in turn can be described by a set of attributes, in our case the amount of rewards at different times. Therefore, we analyze the problem with a random utility framework developed by McFadden (1973) . The utility function consists of two parts, an observable part to the researcher, v , and an unobservable part,  , which is treated as an error term. If we assume that there are only two alternatives to choose between, then the probability of choosing alternative A for individual i in choice situation j is equal to the probability that the utility from choosing alternative A is higher than the utility from choosing alternative B:
where X is a vector of attributes. From the experiment we want to measure the influence, or the bargaining power, of the wife (W) and the husband (H). In order to estimate this, we first need to estimate the preferences of the husband and the wife separately. For a wife in household i, the probability of choosing the early reward (A) in choice situation j is assumed to be:
where alternative A is the early reward, and alternative B is the delayed reward. If utility is a linear function of the timing and amount of the rewards, the probabilistic model can be written as
where W i  is included to allow for a preference for early or late reward that is not explained by the difference in time or amount. This could for example be an indication of status-quo bias or simply a reflection of a left-hand or right-hand side preference.
In the experiment, there are two possible levels of the timing of the early reward -0 (now) days and 4 days -and two possible levels of the timing of the late reward -4 days and 8 days. In order to allow for non-linear effects of timing and the difference in amount on the probability we express the probability of choosing an early reward as
where D 08 is a dummy variable equal to one when the early reward is today and the later reward is in 8 days from now, and D 48 a dummy variable equal to one when the early reward is in 4 days and the later is in 8 days,
,  and  are parameters, and
amount is included into the model since both the starting amount and the difference between early and later reward could matter for subjects' decisions. Thus, we allow for non-linear effects of both the difference in time and the level of the amount and the difference in amount on the probability of choosing the early reward.
For a husband in household i the probability of choosing an early reward in choice situation j is expressed in the same way
The preferences of the wife and husband can be estimated with standard discrete choice models.
However, we will apply random parameter models (see Train, 2003) . In a random parameter model framework, the coefficients of the attributes are assumed to be randomly distributed due to unobserved preference heterogeneity. This means that we can obtain individual-specific predicted choice probabilities for a particular choice situation, denoted as H ij P and W ij P , even if we do not include individual characteristics as explanatory variables. We assume that all the parameters are normally distributed. Since we have repeated observations, we assume that the parameters are constant across choice sets for a given respondent. Finally, we assume that the error term is normally distributed, which means that we estimated a random parameter binary probit models.
The models are estimated using simulated maximum likelihood.
In the next step we estimate a similar model explaining the choices in the joint decisions. The choice probability of the couple's choice is then not only a function of the specific attributes of the choice situation, but also of the predicted probabilities of the spouses choices ( This way we can measure the influence of the spouses on the joint decision. The probability of choosing the early reward (A) in the joint time preference experiment is then specified as
This model is also estimated as a random parameter model. All the parameters are again specified as normally distributed and assumed to be constant across the choice situations for a household.
What we are interested in here is to obtain household specific estimates of the two parameters relating to the influence of the husband and wife on the joint decisions, i.e. the parameters of the predicted choice probabilities. The ratio of these two parameters can then be used to estimate the relative influence of the husband and wife on the joint decision by calculating the ratio
If the ratio is larger than one, then the wife has more influence than the husband on the joint decision, and vice versa.
In order to obtain the parameter estimates for
ˆ and
H i
ˆ we rely on simulation (remember that we estimate a distribution of the parameters, and not individual specific parameters). This is done by using Bayes Theorem (Revelt and Train, 2000) .
denotes the distribution of a parameter vector  conditional on a sequence of choices ( i y ) and the population parameters ( ), Train (2003) shows that the mean  for an individual i making a specific choice is
is the distribution of  in the population. The expression in equation (9) is thus an estimate of the parameter for a particular individual (in our case a spouse or a household). This estimate in turn comes from the estimated population distribution that we obtain with the random parameter model. This expression does not have a closed form and therefore we again have to rely on simulation methods. The simulated approximation to equation (9) We are primarily interested in the distribution of the ratio of the two parameters relating to the influence of the husband and wife on the joint decision. However, we are also interested in finding household-characteristics that can explain the variation of the variable i Influence among the households. In the final part of the analysis, we estimate a regression model where the relative influence is explained by a number of household characteristics, such as the education level of the spouses, the income and income contribution of the spouses, the age of the spouses, or the length of their marriage. Table 3 reports the share of early reward choices by husbands and wives separately, as well as the joint choices by the couples. The data in Table 3 show that husbands choose early rewards more often than wives. However, Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests do not reveal any significant distributional differences in the choices between today and in four days, between four days and eight days, or between today and in eight days, or among couples and husbands and wives respectively. There are eight households in which the husband and wife made exactly the same choices in all 18 choice situations. We will exclude these households from the rest of the analysis because it is impossible to obtain any information about the individual spouses' influence on the joint decision from these observations. This leaves us with 93 married couples for analysis and estimation. In a few cases, the husband or the wife makes inconsistent choices. 5 In three cases, the husband made inconsistent choices, and in three cases the wife. Furthermore, in one case the joint decision is inconsistent. We keep these inconsistent choices in the analysis in particular since our econometric model allows for inconsistent choice by inclusion of the error term.
Results
Now we turn to econometric method to analyze the household time preference decision making.
The first step of the analysis is to estimate the random parameter models for the individual choices. We estimate random parameter binary probit models. All models are estimated in Nlogit 3.0 using 500 Halton draws. The results are presented in Columns 1-4 in Table 4 . Not all mean coefficients are significant, but all estimated standard deviations are, indicating that we are capturing unobserved heterogeneity. The constant is positive and significant for both groups, which indicates that there is a preference for early rewards not related to the variation in the timing of the rewards or the amount of the rewards. The coefficient of the dummy variable for 4 versus 8 days is insignificant for both husbands and wives, and since the reference case is 0 versus 4 days, this is an indication that the subjects do not have a present bias. However, the coefficient of the dummy for 0 versus 8 days is significant meaning that, not surprisingly, when the time difference between early and late reward increases, the likelihood of choosing the early reward increases. The amount of the early reward has no significant impact on the choices, but the difference in rewards has, which implies no income effect regarding the initial endowment of early reward in the experiment. As expected, if the difference between the late and early reward increases, the likelihood of choosing the early reward decreases.
The next model to estimate is the probability of choosing the early reward in the joint decisions.
The results are presented in Columns 5-6 in Table 4 . As explained earlier, the predicted choice probabilities of the husband and wife are now used as explanatory variables in addition to the characteristics of the alternatives. In the joint model, the constant is insignificant. In addition, just as in the individual models, the mean parameter of the dummy variable for 4 versus 8 days and the mean parameter of the amount of early reward variable are insignificant, although the 5 Four of the choices can be used to test for consistent time preference since the amount of the early reward and the timing delay to the late reward are constant within each pair. If the individual or couple has made time inconsistent choices for any of the four pairs of choices, they are defined as time inconsistent. . standard deviation parameters are significant. The parameters of the predicted probabilities of the husband and the wife are highly significant indicating that on average both the male and female preferences influence the joint decision. The mean estimated coefficient is larger for husbands, suggesting that husbands on average have a stronger influence on the joint decision than wives. The estimated model does not predict a large variation in the relative influence on the joint decision. However, it is still interesting to see if we can explain some of the variation with household characteristics. This is done by estimating a truncated regression model with the relative influence as the dependent variable. The results are presented in Table 5 . As expected when using experimental data with small sample size and little variation in the dependent variable, it is difficult to explain the variation in the influence on the joint decision among the households. However, three characteristics have significant effects on the relative influence of husbands and wives. If the household is richer, then the wife has a stronger influence on the joint decision. If the couple has been married for a longer time, the wife also has more influence.
Finally, the influence is correlated with the couples' self-reported responsibility of small investment decisions. In households where the husband mainly decides small investment decisions, the influence on the joint decision in the time preference experiment is stronger for the husband. 
Discussion and conclusion
In this paper we have suggested to use recent developments of random parameter models in econometrics to analyze experimental data on household decision-making. So far most household experiments have contained only few observations, which do not lend themselves for parametric analyses. However, experiments with larger sample sizes are on its way. The contribution of random parameter models is the possibility to retrieve parameters at individual level, which either is at spouse or household level depending on observation unit.
As for the intra-household bargaining power, the results correspond to the traditional Chinese norm that men mainly take charge of the household decisions. But female influence become more important when the decision consequence become less important for them when getting rich, and with longer time living together, female are likely take over more household decisions from male.
